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I. INTRODUCTION 
In fiscal year 2018, the federal government will provide American 
small businesses with nearly billions of dollars in contract opportunities and 
targeted assistance.1 Among such contracts, the government reserves and 
allocates substantial sums of contract dollars for small businesses run by 
historically-disadvantaged individuals, such as minorities and women.2 
Unfortunately, individuals (referred to as “white collar criminals”) steal 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually from various government programs 
by means of fraud, embezzlement or improper disbursement.3 Sentencing 
white collar criminals creates challenging issues for the courts, including 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. in Criminal Justice, 
Northeastern University, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor John Kip Cornwell 
for his guidance during the drafting process and Nick McClelland for going above and beyond 
in his role as his Circuit Review Journal Mentor.  
 1  USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/agency/803 (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2018).  
 2  See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2016); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 (2014). 
 3  Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 61 
WAYNE L. REV. 343 (2015) (defining “white collar criminals” as unique because they share 
several distinct characteristics: they are typically white, older, and better educated with no 
prior criminal history); see Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a) 
Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS, 
http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); see also 
Michelle McVicker, The Real Cost of DBE Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 1, 8 (2016) (stating 
that the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 
million dollars over 15 years). 
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how to punish behavior not immediately recognizable as criminal, since 
fraud crimes often implicate amorphous victims.4 Without reforming the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (the “Guidelines”) Comment 
Application Notes (the “Notes”), the small business procurement market of 
individual minority and women business owners will continue to suffer 
harm.5 
Circuit courts use two major approaches to calculate loss when 
criminals steal money intended for minority or women businesses: the 
“general loss” rule and the  “government benefits” rule.6 As a result, a circuit 
split exists between circuit courts that apply the general loss rule, and those 
that apply the government  benefits rule.7 The decision as to whether to apply 
the general loss rule or the government benefits rule matters because an 
individual can defraud the government, but be subject to considerably 
different punishments based on the circuit in which the fraud is tried.8 For 
example, under the general loss rule, if small business owner A defrauds the 
government of one million dollars and uses some of the funds for legitimate 
purposes, he will have the legitimate services subtracted from the one million 
dollars awarded. Importantly, owner A will see a reduction in prison time 
because he performed on the contract to some extent. In contrast, if small 
business owner B defrauds the government of one million dollars deemed to 
be “government benefits,” B will owe the entire one million dollars in 
restitution and be sentenced as such, regardless of any legitimate services 
provided. Therefore, dramatic discrepancies in federal sentencing breed 
unfairness and injustice, and reinforce the need for a uniform sentencing 
policy in fraud cases involving “affirmative action” programs. 
In this note, I will argue that the United States Sentencing Commission 
(the “Commission”) should amend the calculation for loss under section 
2B1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines to clarify that an individual who steals from 
“affirmative action” programs will be liable for every dollar received from 
the government, without any reduction for legitimate services rendered.9 In 
 
 4  Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (defining “amorphous victims” as “the market” or a 
faceless organization that does not suffer in the same way one who is robbed or assaulted 
would); see Christopher C. Reese, Note, A New Sentencing Blueprint: The Third Circuit 
Allows Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud Convictions to Be Offset by Construction 
Contract Performance in United States v. Nagle, 61 VILL. L. REV. 681, 681–88 (2016). 
 5  Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that white collar crime and procurement fraud 
implicates unseen harm). 
 6  See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 602 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying the 
general loss rule); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying 
the government benefits rule). 
 7  See Harris, 821 F.3d at 602; Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1307. 
 8  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see also id. § 2B1.1 n.3(A) (2016). 
 9  See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
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the alternative, to avoid varying interpretations concerning whether the 
Small Business Administration 8(a) (the “SBA”) and Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise (the “DBE”) programs are “government benefits,” the 
Commission should add the following text to the enumerated list of examples 
included in the 3(F)(ii) special rules: 
Government benefits shall include “Small Business 
Administration and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise grants or 
any type of federal program payments enacted with the purpose of 
giving exclusive opportunities to women businesses, minority 
businesses, or businesses run by any class of disadvantaged 
persons.”10 
Lastly, until the Commission revises the Notes, the Supreme Court 
should consider SBA 8(a) contracts and DBE grants to be “government 
benefits” within the meaning of 3(F) for federal sentencing purposes. 
First, this note will introduce the Commission, the Guideline comments 
language, and provide a detailed explanation of the relevant rule provisions. 
Part II will explore the history of the Commission, the specific comment 
rules at issue, and the purpose of SBA 8(a) and DBE programs. Part III will 
explain the various circuit court decisions regarding the Note application. 
Fourth, the note will evaluate both sides of the circuit split and argue that 
affirmative action procurement programs should be considered “government 
benefits.” Finally, this will note argue that the Commission should amend 
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to explicitly state that “affirmative action” government 
contracts programs belong under the government benefits special rule under 
3(F)(ii). 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Congress Creates the Commission & the Guidelines 
The United States Sentencing Commission, created by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, is an independent agency within the judicial branch.11 Congress tasked 
the Commission with instituting “sentencing policies and practices for the 
federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by 
promulgating detailed guidelines, and prescribing the appropriate sentences 
for offenders convicted of federal crimes.”12 The Commission includes seven 
 
 10  See id. 
 11  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2004); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Title II, 98 
Stat. 1976 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (outlining duties of the 
Commission); see generally Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984). 
 12  Id. 
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voting members (typically a combination of federal judges, federal 
prosecutors, and legal scholars) and two ex officio non-voting members 
(including representatives from the parole commission and the Attorney 
General).13 Importantly, Congress espoused three overarching principles in 
creating the Commission: (1) combat crime honestly through an effective, 
fair system, (2) introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing 
discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 
offenders, and (3) sentence proportionally in a way that accounts for severity 
of offenses and repeat offenders.14 The circuit split on whether to apply the 
general loss rule or the government benefits rule should be resolved to 
realign the sentencing rules with Congress’s three guiding principles. 
B. Calculating the Proper Guidelines Sentence under United States v. 
Booker 
After an individual is convicted of a federal crime, federal courts apply 
the Guidelines to determine the appropriate sentence and any potential 
restitution owed by the convicted criminal.15 Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines 
covers economic crimes including larceny, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, 
and counterfeiting offenses.16 The Guidelines provide a sentencing structure 
for federal courts while streamlining the mechanics of federal sentencing.17 
In United States v. Booker, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Guidelines’ requirements are not mandatory, and appellate courts must 
review federal sentences calculated under the Guidelines for 
unreasonableness.18 The process by which federal courts apply the 
Guidelines varies slightly among the circuit courts of appeals; however, the 
Third Circuit’s three-step process serves as an instructive example of how 
courts calculate an appropriate federal sentence in compliance with Booker.19 
 
 13  U.S.S.G.  ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2; see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008). 
 14  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, p.s.; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2008). 
 15  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 16  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018). 
 17  Booker, 543 U.S. at 264; see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018). 
 18  Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2018) (“No limitation shall be 
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person 
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence”). 
 19  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015); see, e.g., United States v. 
Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 374–77 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court may use a less 
rigid federal sentencing procedure to bypass a “minefield of tricky determinations” so long as 
the court arrives at the correct Guidelines sentencing range and explicitly weighs the required 
§ 3553(a) factors); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 454–58 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
the appropriate standard for calculating federal sentences under the Guidelines post-Booker 
involves a four-step analysis where the district court must (1) properly calculate the 
sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines; (2) determine whether a sentence within 
that range and within the statutory limitations serves the factors set forth in § 3553(a), and, if 
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In the Third Circuit, a district court calculated an appropriate sentence under 
Booker by identifying the correct sentencing range under the Guidelines, 
considering departure motions from the base offense level, and applying any 
variances that may justify an increase or decrease in an individual’ 
sentence.20 
In the Third Circuit, the three-step sentencing process begins with the 
calculation of an applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.21 As 
mentioned above, the Guidelines range functions as the starting point or the 
“Base Offense Level” for a court to begin the sentencing calculation.22 
Relevant to the analysis, the court examines “[t]he amount of loss that . . . 
[a] defendant is found to have caused to determine the recommended 
sentencing range under the Guidelines.”23 Second, after the court establishes 
the base offense level, the district court considers departure motions.24 A 
departure motion allows the court to consider “depart[ing] from the 
applicable guidelines range” where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance . . .”25 Guideline departures, which must be carefully justified 
and explained by the court, should only apply in “atypical case[s]” and the 
Guidelines enumerate reasons for adjusting sentences upward or 
downward.26 In government fraud cases, a court may find upward variations 
for harm to unaccounted for property or crimes that cause a “significant 
disruption of a governmental function.”27 In the final step of the sentencing 
 
not, select a sentence that does serve those factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory 
limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the particular sentence, especially 
explaining why a sentence outside of the Guidelines range better serves the relevant 
sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a)); United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
 20  Id. 
 21  See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179 (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308). 
 22  See id. 
 23  Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just 
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1003 (2010) 
(discussing the importance of loss calculation in determining the appropriate Guidelines range 
in white collar crime sentencing). 
 24  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A)(U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2004) (prescribing departure process). 
 25  See id.; United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing step two 
of sentencing calculation process where departure motions must be considered). 
 26  See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures 
and Variances at 5 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. 
A(4)(b)) (describing application of departures and noting they should “only apply in the 
‘atypical’ case lying outside the ‘heartland’ of conduct covered by the guidelines”); see also 
id. at 4–40 (detailing overview of departures authorized by the Guidelines); see also Fumo, 
655 F.3d at 308.  
 27  OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and 
Variances at 19-20 (2018); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5. provides for an upward departure if “the offense 
caused property damage or loss not taken into account within the guidelines.”; see id. § 5K2.7 
(stating that if the defendant’s conduct resulted in a “significant disruption of a governmental 
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analysis, the district court must consider applying variances pursuant to the 
statutory factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).28 Section 3553(a) 
obliges courts to impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary.”29 Federal courts may consider (among other things) the 
following factors in imposing a sentence: (1) “the nature and circumstances 
of the offense,” (2) the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect of the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense, 
and (3) the need for deterrence.”30 Overall, federal courts calculate an 
appropriate sentence for financial crimes contained in section 2B1.1 by using 
the range calculated in step one, adding or subtracting (via aggravating or 
mitigating factors) departures in step two, and increasing or decreasing the 
range to reflect any applicable variances.31 
C. The Small Business Jobs Act and Section 2B1.1 Loss Rules Under 
the Guidelines Applying to “Affirmative Action” Contract Fraud. 
As illustrated above, Guidelines section 2B1.1 prescribes offense level 
calculations for economic crimes including fraud and deceit.32 Within 
section 2B1.1, subsection (A) provides the base offense level and subsection 
(B) provides a detailed list of modifications for offense-specific 
characteristics that can increase or decrease an offender’s base sentencing 
level based on various aggravating and mitigating factors.33 In calculating 
loss, the Guidelines provide for baseline loss and sentencing totals that may 
be adjusted upward proportionally in cases where an increase in loss 
increases the convicted criminal’s aggregate restitution owed and prison 
term.34 Two of the most pertinent rules within section 2B1.1 for calculating 
 
function,” the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range “to reflect 
the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function 
affected.”). 
 28  See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (explaining third step of sentencing process where “court 
[must] consider[] the recommended Guidelines range together with statutory factors . . . and 
determine[] the appropriate sentence . . .”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 317 
(explaining the difference between departures and variances where departures are deviations 
from the Guidelines range based on “reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves,” 
while variances are deviations “based on an exercise of the court’s discretion under [18 
U.S.C.] § 3553(a)”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (instructing courts on appropriate factors to consider for 
imposing a sentence). 
 30  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (detailing several relevant factors courts should consider 
in determining whether a variance may be applicable in the DBE/8(a) “affirmative action” 
contract fraud context). 
 31  See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing a court’s responsibility at the third step of the 
sentencing analysis). 
 32  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id.  
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sentencing totals for fraud in the “affirmative action” contract context 
include (1) the general loss rule and (2) the government loss rules.35 
1. The General Loss Rule in 3(A) & the Government Loss Rule 
in 3(F)(ii) 
In cases involving government contract fraud, the general loss rule 
provides the starting point for the sentencing analysis.36 The general loss rule 
applies to losses under subsection (b)(1) and states that “loss is the greater of 
actual loss or intended loss.”37 The Notes define “actual loss” as “reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”38 Pecuniary 
harm “means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable 
in money.”39 Intended loss is defined as the pecuniary harm that offender 
sought to inflict.40 In invoking the general loss rule, instead of the 
government benefits rule, federal courts cite section 2B1.1 Note 3(A)(v)(II) 
as the appropriate provision governing procurement fraud cases for fraud 
related to a defense contract award.41 To that end, some judges apply Note 
3(A)(v)(II) regardless of the nature, circumstances or purpose surrounding 
the defense contract award.42 
The government benefits rule, a special rule under Note 3(F)(ii) that 
supplants the general loss rule, applies in cases involving “government 
benefits” including fraud of grants, loans, and entitlement program 
payments.43 In government benefits fraud cases, the Guidelines require that 
“loss shall be considered to be not less than the value of the benefits obtained 
by unintended recipients or diverted from intended uses.”44 In short, if a court 
concludes that an offender’s fraud included “government benefits,” the loss 
for sentencing purposes will be the entire total of the grant or contract 
awarded without any mitigation for legitimate services rendered.45 As shown 
above, the decision of whether to apply the general rule or the government 
benefits rule plays a major role in determining an individual’s aggregate 
 
 35  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2016); see id. cmt. n.3(F). 
 36  Id. n.3(A). 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. n.3(A)(i). 
 39  Id. n.3(A)(iii). 
 40  Id. n.3(A)(ii). 
 41  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring) 
 42  Id. 
 43  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2016).  
 44  Id. 
 45  Id.  
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sentence.46 
2. Current Issues in Interpreting & Applying the Guideline Notes 
Currently, there are varying interpretations of whether an “affirmative 
action” government contract program constitutes a “government benefit.” 
Furthermore, there are textual issues within the Guideline’s comments which 
continue to frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by creating the 
Commission. As stated by Congress, the Commission was founded to 
“provide certainty and fairness” in sentencing, “[avoid] unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar criminal conduct,” maintain flexibility in sentencing 
sufficient to “permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating 
and aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general 
sentencing practices,” and “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice 
process[.]”47 Presently, the conflict between Note 3(E)(i), Note 3(F)(ii), and 
the current comment’s language asserting that 3(F)(ii) applies 
“notwithstanding subsection (A)” creates problems with consistent statutory 
interpretation.48 Moreover, in cases involving SBA 8(a) defense contract 
procurement fraud, courts may properly conclude that 3(A)(v)(II) applies in 
cases of “procurement fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract 
award.”49 If 3(A)(v)(II) applies, like 3(E)(ii), the general loss rule must be 
used for calculating sentence severity and requires that the amount lost be 
mitigated so that loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss, not the full 
amount awarded under the contract.50 
3. The “Affirmative Action” Government Programs at Issue: 
Well-Intentioned Programs Exploited. 
 a. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Joint Venture 
Program 
The SBA, created under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 
exists to “ensure small businesses [receive] a ‘fair proportion’ of government 
contracts.”51 Many fraud cases involve the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, a 
 
 46  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (2016); see also id. n.3(A); see infra Part I. 
 47  28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008); see U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (2016). 
 48  See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 49  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II). 
 50  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1; Harris, 821 F.3d at 608. 
 51  Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–699, § 102, 72 Stat. 689 
(1958); About the SBA: The Founding of the SBA, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history (last visited Dec. 17, 2018),; see 15 
U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (containing a declaration of SBA policy); see also 15 U.S.C. § 661 
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federal program which allows small businesses lacking the capability (due 
to size and money) to perform contracts on their own, to enter into a joint 
venture agreement with a larger, more capable, business to perform the 
contract.52 Specifically, the Section 8(a) Joint Venture Program authorizes 
the SBA to award federal procurement contracts to qualifying small 
businesses.53 Under the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, participants can receive 
up to four million dollars for goods and services and up to 6.5 million for 
manufacturing ventures.54 To qualify for 8(a) contracts, a small business 
“must be owned and controlled by one or more ‘socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals’” including women and minority owned 
businesses.55 As such, the 8(a) program provides procurement opportunities 
by acting as an “affirmative action” contracting program.56 SBA attempts to 
curb fraudulent joint venture arrangements by warning applicants that joint 
venture approval may be denied where an 8(a) firm brings its 8(a) status and 
little else to the joint venture.57 SBA actively monitors for fraudulent joint 
ventures, and requires all parties under the Joint Venture Agreement to 
specify how the division of labor requirements will be met, with businesses 
owned by disadvantaged groups performing at least 40% of the work.58 
Unfortunately, many businesses have stolen millions of dollars by 
misrepresenting its 8(a) status or by joining with a non-8(a) business as a 
matter of pretense, only to have the non-8(a) business complete most of the 
contract work and reap most of the award dollars.59 
 b. The Department of Transportation’s Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise Program 
The Department of Transportation (“DOT”), which requires (under 
authority from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) any state that 
receives federal transportation funds to set goals for participation by 
 
(stating that the overall purpose and policy of Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is to 
“improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the small-business segment 
thereof in particular by establishing a program to stimulate and supplement the flow of private 
equity capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound 
financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization, 
and which are not available in adequate supply”). 
 52  See 13 C.F.R § 124.513 (2016). 
 53  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A) – (B) (2016).  
 54  U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 52.   
 55  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2016); id. § 637 (a)(1)(C).  
 56  See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2016).  
 57  13 C.F.R § 124.513(a)(2). 
 58  13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (stating that the 40% labor division requirement became 
effective in March 2011 where prior to that date, SBA regulations required that an 8(a) firm 
complete a “significant portion” of the contract work, but no percentage was explicitly 
specified); 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(7). 
 59  See Moran, supra note 3. 
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disadvantaged business enterprises in transportation construction projects, 
remains susceptible to fraud and abuse.60 The DOT spends approximately 
fifty-billion dollars annually on construction projects, and the government 
requires that roughly ten percent of its construction budget, or five billion 
dollars, be allocated to qualifying DBEs.61 A DBE is a for-profit small 
business that “is at least 51% owned by an individual or individuals who are 
both socially and economically disadvantaged and whose management and 
daily operations are controlled by one or more of the disadvantaged 
individuals who own it.”62 Additionally, states must announce DBE 
participation goals and certify a business as a DBE prior to contract 
bidding.63 To be considered a certified DBE, a business must “perform . . . a 
commercially useful function on [the] contract.64 Therefore, like SBA 8(a) 
requirements, a DBE whose “role is limited to that of an extra participant in 
a transaction, contract, or project through which funds are passed in order to 
obtain the appearance of DBE participation” does not qualify for DBE 
participation.65 Regrettably, as with the SBA 8(a) program, the DOT’s DBE 
program remains susceptible to fraud and abuse because individuals seeking 
lucrative government contracts can creatively set up businesses and joint 
ventures that use one party’s DBE status as a cover to receive federal funds.66 
 c. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 Statutory 
 
 60  49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014) (defining “socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals” to include African-Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, 
Hispanic Americans, and women among other classifications); 49 C.F.R. § 26.21 (2014); see 
generally 49 C.F.R. § 26(A–C); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–26.109 (2016); see also 23 U.S.C. § 324 
(2012) (stating that no individual receiving federal assistance may be discriminated against 
on the basis of gender under agency authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see 
also George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise 
Programs, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 423 (2007) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.3); see also 
George R. La Noue, Western States’ Light: Restructuring the Federal Transportation 
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (citing 
49 § U.S.C. 31105(f) (2012)). 
 61  See McVicker, supra note 3, at 4. 
 62  49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014); see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 261 
(2000) (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting that minority and women subcontractors are frequently 
subject to less traditional or obvious disadvantages “than direct, intentional racial prejudice”). 
 63  49 C.F.R § 26.81. 
 64  49 C.F.R § 26.55(c). 
 65  49 C.F.R § 26.55(c)(2). 
 66  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-89-26,  HIGHWAY CONTRACTING: 
ASSESSING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S 
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (1988) (finding that contractors paid over 
1 million dollars to settle fraud claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and 
investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 8–9 (stating the 
largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million 
dollars over 15 years and 18.7 million dollar fraud perpetrated by steel company using phone 
invoices). 
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Presumption: A New Complication 
The Small Business Jobs Act arguably creates a presumption that “loss” 
in all small-business-fraud schemes must be the full value of the contract.67 
Section (w)(1) states: 
In every contract, subcontract . . . or grant which is set aside, 
reserved or otherwise classified as intended for award to small 
business concerns, there shall be a presumption of loss to the 
United States based on the total amount expended . . . whenever it 
is established that a business concern other than a small business 
concern willfully sought and received the award by 
misrepresentation.68 
The statutory presumption in the law may appear straightforward, but 
courts continue to struggle with how, or even if, the statutory language 
interacts with the Guidelines’ command to credit loss in the sentencing 
rules.69 The regulation implementing the presumption states, “it is SBA’s 
intent that the presumption of loss shall be applied in all manner of criminal, 
civil, administrative, contractual, common law, or other actions, which the 
United States government may take to redress willful misrepresentation.”70 
Congress initially intended to make the presumption “irrefutable,” but 
ultimately did not do so because of due process concerns.71 However, 
evidence suggests that Congress intended that the presumption only be 
rebuttable in cases of unintentional error, technical malfunction, or other 
similar situations.72 Therefore, courts have held that fully performing on an 
illegally obtained contract cannot rebut the statutory presumption.73 The 
Small Business Act presumption adds one more wrinkle in the already 
confusing morass of assessing loss in the “affirmative action” contract 
context. 
III. CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION & 
APPLICATION OF THE RULES 
In the absence of Supreme Court or Commission guidance on whether 
 
 67  See Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 632(w). 
 68 15 U.S.C. § 632(w)(1). 
 69  United States v. Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that 
Congress may have created a clear statutory presumption that “it is not at all clear that 
Congress intended for this presumption to supplant aspects of the Guidelines calculation that 
the Commission has determined otherwise apply to yield to the total loss amount”).  
 70  Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811–12, 38816 (June 28, 
2013). 
 71  United States v. Singh, 195 F. Supp. 25, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 72  See Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811–12 (June 28, 2013). 
 73  See, e.g., Singh, 195 F. Supp. at 30–31. 
SABO (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2019  11:11 AM 
2019] AFFIRMATIVELY AMBIGUOUS 169 
to apply the general loss rule or the government benefits rule to “affirmative 
action” contract fraud cases, circuit courts continue to reach contradictory 
conclusions that endangering Congress’s goal of crafting uniform and fair 
federal sentencing guidelines. In all, two circuits, the Fifth Circuit and the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies.74 Conversely, the 
Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit apply the 
government benefits rule, voiding any mitigation provisions in the general 
rule.75 Finally, the Third Circuit in United States v. Nagle assumed that SBA 
and DBE programs should be considered “government benefits,” but, 
declined to resolve the issue definitively because the court concluded that 
comment 3(E)(i) displaces 3(F)(ii) as currently written.76 Despite the Third 
Circuit’s refusal to decide whether comment rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to 
DBE programs, the court applied 3(E)(ii) to mitigate the defendant’s 
sentence.77 In sum, the Third Circuit reached a legally sound conclusion 
given the Notes’ current statutory construction. However, the Nagle court’s 
ruling exposes the need to immediately reform the Notes given the billions 
of taxpayer dollars that remain vulnerable. 
A. Circuits That Apply the General Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action” 
Program Fraud Cases 
In United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit decided whether to apply 
the general loss rule or the government benefit rule in a fraud case involving 
the SBA’s 8(a) Joint Venture Program.78 Harris, a retired Army Colonel who 
worked for a non-8(a) firm that performed large-scale defense projects, 
created a joint venture with an 8(a) SBA-approved business –Tropical and 
Luster.79 Overall, the joint venture received three 8(a) contracts worth a total 
of $1,317,593.51.80 Harris defrauded the federal government by joining with 
Tropical and Luster to receive 8(a) status, but failing to give either of the 
8(a)-qualified companies a significant role in the planning or execution of 
 
 74  United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Martin, 
796 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 75  United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 
321 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 76  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Harris, 821 F.3d at 592. 
 79  Id. at 592–93. 
 80  Id. at 594–602 (applying the government benefits rule and determining that an offense-
level increase of sixteen levels was appropriate after having calculated the loss amount as 
approximately $1.3 million. That loss amount encompassed “the total amount awarded under 
both contracts,” “[n]ot including the payment corresponding to the count of wire fraud for 
which [Harris] was acquitted”).  
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the process, as the Guidelines require.81 In short, Harris flouted the 
aforementioned SBA 8(a) regulations by paying Tropical and Luster 51% of 
the project profits to “make everything look legitimate.”82 The District Court 
for the Western District of Texas found Harris guilty on all counts, and he 
challenged the loss calculation, which led to a two-level adjustment for his 
role in the crime, a two-level adjustment for abusing a position of trust, and 
a sixteen-level increase under section 2B1.1(a)(1).83 On appeal, Harris 
argued that the government did not show that his business harmed the 
procuring agencies, since the Joint Venture performed all contracted for 
services.84 Harris also argued that the loss amount totaled zero, because 
neither the 8(a) companies, nor the government suffered pecuniary harm as 
a result of his actions.85 Finally, Harris argued that, in the alternative, the 
court “can look to the gain from the scheme, which is also zero.”86 In reply, 
the government argued on appeal that contracts awarded under the 8(a) 
program are “government benefits” and subject to the 3(F) special rule where 
the court should determine loss by adding the face value of the contracts with 
no loss mitigation.87 
The Fifth Circuit held that the 8(a) program did not constitute 
“government benefits” under section 2B1.1, Note 3(F)(ii); therefore, defense 
contract loss should be calculated under the general rule.88 The court 
determined that “the general rule . . . [applies] [i]n the case of a procurement 
fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”89 The court further 
stated that 8(a) procurement contracts do not constitute “government 
benefits” because 3(F) only applies to grants, loans, and entitlement program 
payments.90 To that end, although the enumerated list in 3(F) is not 
necessarily exhaustive, the doctrine of noscitur a sociss canon asserts that an 
enumerated list can only be expanded to entities sharing the common 
features of the enumerated examples.91 Moreover, the court reasoned that 
“while a government contract awarded under an affirmative action program 
may be, in some sense, a ‘benefit,’ it does share any common features [of the 
 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. at 596. 
 83  Id. at 597–98.  
 84  Harris, 821 F.3d at 603.  
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B)) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“The court shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an 
alternate measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.”).  
 87  Harris, 821 F.3d at 602.  
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 603; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (2016). 
 90  Harris, 821 F.3d at 603. 
 91  Id.; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 559–60 (2012) (describing the noscitur a sociis canon). 
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enumerated list],” and it is a bargained for exchange, not a unilateral 
transfer.92 
Likewise, the court was not persuaded by its sister circuits who 
concluded that the government benefits rule applied because “the mere fact 
that a government contract furthers some public policy objective apart from 
the government’s procurement needs is not enough to transform the contract 
into a ‘government benefit’ akin to a grant or an entitlement payment 
program.”93 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the loss amount should not be 
the total contract price (as under 3(F)), but rather the “contract price less the 
fair market value of services rendered by the Joint Venture to the procuring 
agencies.”94 The court reasoned that, when calculating total loss under 
Section 2B1.1(b)(1), 3(E)(i), the “[l]oss shall be reduced by . . . the fair 
market value of the . . . services rendered.”95 The court held that note 3(E)(i) 
applies broadly to all sections of Section 2B1.1(b) including loss under the 
general rule.96 The Fifth Circuit joined the Third and Ninth Circuits in 
concluding that if the Commission wanted 3(F)(ii) to apply to the general 
rule in 3(A), the Commission would not have included rule 3(F)(v), which 
requires that “loss to be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered 
to the defendant.”97 
In United States v. Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that “the sentencing 
court [should] not use the entire amount of government contract dollars 
awarded to defendant in calculating loss for fraud cases involving the SBA 
8(a) program or the state-administered DBE contracts.”98 In this case, 
defendant Martin owned a construction company (“MarCon”) that focused 
on installing steel guardrails and concrete barriers on public highways.99 
Over a seven-year period (1999-2006), MarCon “received nearly $20 million 
from 85 contracts awarded through the DBE program, and successfully 
performed each contract.”100 MarCon also received three contracts worth 
nearly three million dollars from SBA programs.101 The federal government 
caught Martin diverting profits made from the SBA and DBE programs to 
accounts hidden from the IRS.102 By not reporting these profits, Martin 
 
 92  Harris, 821 F.3d at 603. 
 93  Id. at 604.  
 94  Id. at 605. 
 95  Id. at 605; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 96  Harris, 821 F.3d at 605. 
 97  Id. 
 98  United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 99  Id. at 1103.  
 100  Id. at 1104. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 1103. 
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avoided paying over $100,000 in income taxes.103 At sentencing, Martin 
asserted that proper loss to the government was zero given that MarCon fully 
performed on all contracts awarded to it.104 However, the district court found 
pecuniary harm and applied the “procurement fraud rule” (the same rule as 
the Fifth Circuit applied) found in Note 3(A)(v)(II) of section 2B1.1.105 In 
reply, the government argued that the court should apply 3(F)(ii), and 
concluded that the total loss amount equaled the total value of the contracts 
totaling $22 million.106 The district court held that “the government benefits 
rule” applied, but the court concluded that loss under the rule should be three 
million dollars, the total profits earned by Martin.107 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted Martin’s argument, holding that 
the general rule applies to affirmative action contracts under the 3(A)(v)(II) 
“procurement fraud rule.”108 As such, the court stated that 3(E)(i) applied so 
that “[l]oss shall be reduced” by “the fair market value of . . . the services 
rendered . . . by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was 
detected.”109 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the 
“procurement fraud rule” in 3(A)(v)(II) is the closest fit for this case because 
the rule’s “placement within application note 3(A), rather than in note 3(F) 
with the special rules, indicates that procurement fraud cases fall under the 
general rule for calculating actual and intended loss.”110 The Ninth Circuit 
further held that the “government benefits rule” did not apply because the 
3(F) special rules apply “[n]otwithstanding [the general rules of] application 
note 3(A).”111 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applied because 
although “an ‘exclusive opportunity’ might be a benefit in some sense, . . . 
the Guidelines’ focus on pecuniary harm” suggest that comment 3(F)(ii) 
deals exclusively with unilateral government assistance such as food stamps, 
and not fee-for-service business deals.112 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the general rule applied because statutory interpretation requires that, 
when interpreting examples in an enumerated list, all terms must include 
similar characteristics to the enumerated list.113 The court further reasoned 
 
 103  Id. 
 104  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1104. 
 105  Id. at 1108. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1110. 
 111  Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii)(v)) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 112  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1109.  
 113  Id. (citing Hamilton v. Madigan, 961 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
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that if applying basic rules of statutory interpretation fails to illuminate the 
correct result, the rule of lenity compels an interpretation in favor of the 
defendant.114 The rule of lenity in statutory interpretation dictates that, where 
Congress’s intent remains ambiguous and reasonable minds may defer as to 
its intent, courts should adopt the less harsh interpretation of the Guidelines 
punishment.115 Despite concluding that the 3(A) general loss rules applied, 
the court noted that “DBE and SBA programs are designed to benefit 
disadvantaged businesses.”116 The court further stated, “[i]t is conceivable 
that the government paid a premium contract price”; however, any difference 
between what the government paid versus the normal contract price is the 
actual loss.117 Finally, the court conceded that there may be non-pecuniary 
losses to the government in that Martin’s fraud may have harmed the 
integrity of the programs and cheated law abiding DBEs out of potential 
contracts.118 Nevertheless, the court concluded that non-pecuniary loss may 
be properly assessed by the district court in applying the Guidelines under 
the correct rule.119 
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applied the general loss rule 
to “affirmative action” contract procurement fraud finding that either Note 
3(E)(i) supersedes 3(F) in the defense contract fraud context or the 
“[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A)” language 
precluded the application of the government benefits special rule in 
3(F)(ii).120 Both circuits concluded that 3(F)(ii) did not apply by relying on 
general principles of statutory interpretation,121 despite conceding that the 
government “likely” paid a premium for the “affirmative action” contracts 
and tacitly acknowledging that such contracts remain unique in the federal 
contracting scheme.122 
B. Circuits That Apply the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule to 
“Affirmative Action” Program Fraud Cases 
In United States v. Brothers Construction Co., the Fourth Circuit held 
that the government benefits special rule applies in fraud case involving a 
state-administered DBE program.123 In 1994, the West Virginia Department 
 
 114  See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 115  Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 116  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 1112. 
 120  United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2016); Martin, 796 F.3d at 
1110. 
 121  Harris, 821 F.3d at 603. 
 122  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111. 
 123  United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 321 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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of Transportation, Division of Highways (“WVDOH”) solicited bids for a 
$5.2 million DBE project.124 Two business partners (Tri-State) contracted 
with Brothers Construction (a certified DBE) to work on a local highway 
project. After winning the DBE contract, no Brothers employees appeared 
on the job site at any point during the construction.125 
The district court convicted Tri-State and Brothers of defrauding the 
government by scheming to divert DBE funds to a non-DBE business.126 
Brothers and Tri-State argued that the sentencing court erred in concluding 
that under Section 2F1.1. Note 7(d), “[i]n a case involving diversion of 
government program benefits, loss is the value of benefits diverted from 
intended recipients or uses.”127 Brothers and Tri-State further argued that loss 
to the government was zero because all contracts were performed by other 
certified DBEs.128 Thus, defendants argued that the project received required 
DBE performance, and the WVDOH received what it bargained for.129 
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit applied the now-nonexistent Section 2F1.1. 
Note 7(d) government benefits rule to the DBE fraud without explanation.130 
In United States v. Leahy, the Seventh Circuit held that a city ordinance 
meant to direct contracts to minority (“MBEs”) and women-owned 
businesses (“WBEs”) constituted an “affirmative action” program under 
Note 8(d) (the current 3(F)), and thus required sentencing to be based on the 
total contract dollars awarded, with no mitigation for services rendered.131 
The ordinance, like the DBE requirements, mandated that an MBE or 
minority group must own 51% of the company and one or more minority 
members must be involved in day-to-day management.132 After Chicago 
passed the ordinance, James Duff set up a business with his mother (Green 
Duff) to qualify for WBE status.133 An investigation revealed that, although 
Green Duff technically owned all the company stock, she had no real 
involvement with the business’s management.134 Over the course of the 
company’s fraud scheme, Duff received over $100 million dollars in state 
and federal grants.135 Defendants argued on appeal that “the only loss 
 
 124  Id. at 304.  
 125  Id. at 306. 
 126  Id. at 318. 
 127  Id. at 317. 
 128  Id. at 308 (imposing no fine on Brothers Construction Co. because the company was 
insolvent). 
 129  Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d at 318. 
 130  Id. at 317. 
 131  United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 132  Id. at 779. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 780–81. 
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Chicago suffered was to its regulatory interests—an intangible right 
unprotected by these statutes.”136 In the alternative, the defendants argued 
that the Note governing contract procurement applied, rather than the 
government benefits rule.137 Both parties agreed that Guidelines 2F1.1 
applied to this case.138 Yet, the district court determined that the appropriate 
loss number should total the amount of profits gained, not the entire contract 
dollars awarded.139 The Seventh Circuit, citing a former city official’s 
testimony, concluded that the Chicago city ordinance at issue was “an 
affirmative action program whose fruits were reserved for fledgling minority 
and women businesses.”140 
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the government benefit 
rules applied because: 
[T]he goal of Chicago’s program was fundamentally 
frustrated, . . . “it [was] a double loss, the loss that we computed 
and the real loss to all people that [did not] get this business, that 
[did not] get a chance to become [a] successful [MBE] or [WBE], 
because this huge amount was diverted.”141 
The court held that the government benefits rule applies, instead of the 
general loss rule because the ordinance states, “[a]n effect to direct contracts 
to [MBEs] and [WBEs] is required to eradicate the effects of 
discrimination.”142 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that “the correct amount 
under application note 8(d) is the value of the benefits diverted, which was 
over $100 million.”143 
In United States v. Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit held that special rule 
3(F)(ii) applies because “CSBE and DBE programs are government benefits 
programs under § 2B1.1 of the [Guidelines].”144 A Florida grand jury 
indicted Maxwell on twenty-four counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, money 
laundering, and other conspiracy charges.145 At issue were six contracts 
funded by Miami Dade County (the “County”) that required compliance with 
 
 136  Id. at 786. 
 137  Leahy, 464 F.3d at 790. 
 138  Id. at 789. 
 139  Id. at 789 n.3 (“Duff was a highly-experienced businessman who easily made 
substantial profits off the MBE/WBE contracts and paid the surplus to family members and 
associates who performed little or no work for the various entities under contract.”). 
 140 Id. at 779 (“[the city ordinance] was a program to assist those companies to win 
contracts with the City in a competitive situation and become economically viable so that 
they . . . could compete with prime contractors.”). 
 141  Id. at 789 n.3. 
 142  Id. at 790. 
 143  Leahy, 464 F.3d at 790. 
 144  United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 145  Id. at 1288. 
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the County’s Community Small Businesses Enterprise (“CSBE”).146 To 
receive a CSBE contract, the CSBE must “perform a commercially useful 
function in the completion of the contract.”147 A CSBE performs a 
“commercially useful function” when it “actually performs, manages, and 
supervises the work involved.”148 Overall, the CSBE contracts at issue 
demanded the same requirements as the federal DBE contracts previously 
discussed.149 Once the local government approves CSBE status, the 
contractor must submit a Schedule of Participation and Monthly Utilization 
Reports to certify compliance with CSBE and DBE work requirements.150 At 
sentencing, Maxwell objected to the court’s total calculated loss at seven 
million dollars, because “he was not personally awarded the contracts, he did 
not benefit from the contracts, and Fisk (his non-CSBE business partner who 
did all the work and remitted payment to the certified CSBE) made only a 
small profit on the contracts.”151 On appeal, Maxwell challenged the district 
court’s loss amount calculation under section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines.152 The 
government requested a loss amount of $7,974,674,  the total amount of all 
CSBE and DBE contracts awarded.153 The district court, without adopting 
either parties’ argument, concluded that total loss was six percent of the total 
contracts awarded because six percent was the average profit margin on 
government electrical subcontracts.154 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the DBE and similar programs are 
“government benefits” that fall under the special rules.155 The court reasoned 
that “DBE and similar program[s] aimed at giving exclusive opportunities to 
women and minority businesses” makes them entitlement payments, one of 
the enumerated examples in 3(F)(ii).156 “Unlike standard construction 
contracts, these contracts focus mainly on who is doing the work.”157 
Therefore, by applying 3(F)(ii), the “appropriate amount of loss here should 
have been the entire value of the CSBE and SBE contracts that were diverted 
to the unintended recipient.”158 
 
 146  Id. 
 147  Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Cty. Ordinance § 1033.02 (1997); 49 C.F.R. § 26.55(c)(1) 
(2014). 
 148  Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1288 (citing Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Cty. Ordinance § 1033.02; 
49 C.F.R. § 26.55(c)(1)). 
 149  Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1306. 
 150  Id. at 1289 n.2 (citing Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Admin. Order 3-22 as amended).  
 151  Id. at 1294–95.  
 152  Id. at 1305.  
 153  Id. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1306. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
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In United States v. Nagle, the Third Circuit held that under the 
Guidelines’ standard definition of loss, defendants were liable for the total 
value of DBE contracts, minus services and performance pursuant to the 
contracts.159 Nagle and Fink owned a non-DBE manufacturing and 
contracting business called Schuylkill Products, Inc. (“SPI”).160 Later, SPI 
entered into a joint venture with Marikina, a company owned by Cruz, a 
Filipino man who worked on various DBE transportation projects.161 When 
Marikina won the DBE contract, SPI would perform all the work on the 
contract and distribute the profits among the three partners.162 The district 
court concluded that, under section 2B1.1., the defendants owed the face 
value of the contracts without mitigation for work performed.163 Defendants 
argued that the district court should have used Note 3(A) to calculate loss 
instead of 3(F)(ii) because “the DBE program is not a ‘government benefit’ 
and, therefore, whether not they should receive a credit for completing the 
subcontracts.”164 In the alternative, defendants claimed that “they are 
nonetheless entitled to credit under Note 3(F)(ii).165 In reply, the government 
asserted that the 3(F) “government benefits rule” applied making loss the 
total face value of the contracts.166 Importantly, the Third Circuit did not rule 
on whether a DBE contract is a “government benefit,” since, irrespective of 
whether 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full 
value of the contracts with credit for fair market value of services 
provided.167 
The Third Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies under 
3(A) and 3(F) as currently drafted.168 If the 3(A) standard analysis applies, 
the loss defendants must pay back includes the total contract value minus the 
fair market value of performance and raw materials provided.169 Regarding 
whether the 3(F)(ii) applied, the court concluded that “the Government’s 
position [was] persuasive particularly in light of the goals of the DBE 
program,” namely who the program focuses on, and the emphasis on 
 
 159  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 160  Id. at 171.  
 161  Id.at 171–72. 
 162  Id. at 171; 49 C.F.R. § 26.21–81 (2014); see Definition of a Disadvantaged Business 
Enterprise, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, https://www.transportation.gov/civil-
rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/definition-disadvantaged-business-enterprise (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2018). 
 163  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179. 
 164  Id. at 180. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. at 181. 
 167  Id. at 180–81. 
 168  Id. at 180–81. 
 169  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181. 
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benefitting those who perform the work.170 Furthermore, the court hinted that 
the special rule could apply, stating that the DBE program “assumes that 
performance of a contract allows a DBE to not only earn a profit on the deal 
but also to form connections with suppliers, labor, and others in the industry. 
The profit earned, therefore, is not the only benefit the DBE obtains when it 
receives the contract.”171 Accordingly, when the parties “fraudulently 
received the [DBE contracts], the DBE program assumed that all of the 
contract price was going towards benefiting a true DBE.”172 The court 
concluded that if Note 3(F)(ii) applies, the proper loss amount is the total 
face value of the contracts.173 
Overall, even if 3(F)(ii) applies in this case, the subsection is overridden 
by 3(E)(i), based on the Comment’s current text.174 Despite assuming that 
DBE contracts constitute “government benefits,” the Third Circuit held that 
“Note 3(E)(i) requires a credit against the full face value of the contracts 
[regardless as whether 3(A) or 3(F)] applies.]”175 Here, Note 3(E)(i) 
establishes that “the fair market value of the property returned and services 
rendered, by . . . the defendant [] shall be credited against the loss.”176 In 
reply to 3(E)(i), the government argued in Nagle that defendants are not 
entitled to credit because “as non-DBEs they did not ‘render any valuable 
services’” and 3(E)(i) does not apply to 3(F)(ii).177 The court disagreed, 
ruling that 3(E)(i) applied to 3(F)(ii) for two reasons: the 3(F) special rules 
apply “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A),” and 3(F)(v)(II) states that “loss 
shall include the amount paid for the property, services or goods transferred, 
rendered or misrepresented, with no credit for provided for the value of those 
items or services.”178 Notably, the court stated that “[h]ad the [Commission] 
intended to preclude crediting services render against loss for Note 3(F)(ii), 
it would have used similar language as it used in Note 3(F)(v)(II).”179 In 
conclusion, the Third Circuit held that 3(E)(i) and 3(F)(ii) function together 
and require mitigation of the total loss to the government regardless of which 
rule applies.180 
Judge Hardiman, concurring in Nagle, concluded that courts should 
 
 170  Id. at 181.   
 171  Id. 
 172  Id.  
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. at 181. 
 175  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181.; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 
3(E)(i) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).  
 176  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 182. 
 177  Id.  
 178  Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. at 183. 
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calculate DBE fraud using the procurement fraud rule in Note 3(A), not the 
government benefits special rule.181 Judge Hardiman reasoned that 
defendants “committed classic procurement fraud” by lying about 
“compliance with federal regulations in order to receive contracts that would 
have otherwise gone to others.”182 Furthermore, the Guidelines clearly state 
that the 3(A) general rule applies to fraud procurement, with 3(A)(v)(II) 
dictating how 3(A) should be applied in such cases.183 Therefore, 3(F)(ii) 
should apply only in fraudulent receipt of welfare payments and has “no 
place in a procurement fraud case.”184 The current circuit split involving 
whether rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to fraud in the SBA and DBE programs 
continues to divide courts and frustrate Congress’s goals in creating the 
Guidelines Notes; therefore, Note 2B1.1. should be amended to provide 
fairness, continuity and notice to all defendants that defrauding the 
government will be met with a severe, predictable punishment formula. 
C. The D.C. Circuit: A Circuit at Odds with Itself 
In United States v. Singh, Judge Walton, writing for the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, held that the loss to the 
government under fraudulently procured 8(a) contracts should be calculated 
based on the full value of the contracts awarded.185 From 2000 to 2009, Singh 
served as the Vice President of “Company A”, a construction firm that 
specialized in renovating and altering buildings.186 After Company A 
graduated from the SBA 8(a) program on January 12, 2009, a second 
company, “Company B”, submitted an 8(a) application for certification.187 
In June 2009, Company B named Singh as a Vice President of Company B 
and “entered into a Mentor/Protégé Agreement” with Company A.188 Over a 
two and a half year period, the government awarded Company B twenty-six 
8(a) contracts totaling $8,533,562.86.189 During that period, Company B 
maintained only one employee who actually performed work on the 8(a) 
contracts.190 However, during that period, Singh engaged in activities and 
directed others to: replace Company A property with Company B logos, use 
Company B email accounts when corresponding with the government 
regarding Company B contracts, represent to the GSA that Company A 
 
 181  Id. at 183–84 (Hardiman, J., concurring). 
 182  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 184. 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id. 
 185  United States v.Singh,195 F. Supp. 3d 25, 26 (D.D.C. 2016).  
 186  Id. at 27. 
 187  Id.  
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. at 28. 
 190  Id.  
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employees represented Company B on certain jobs, and provide to GSA 
representatives employee lists for Company B that actually included 
individuals employed by Company A.191 Overall, Company A’s profits 
totaled at least $90,397.15 and Singh received personal compensation of at 
least $28,768.28.192 
After discussing the section 2B 1.1(b) loss calculation guidelines and 
surveying the government benefits rule contained in Note 3(F)(ii), the court 
held that the correct loss total should be considered as the full value of the 
contracts fraudulently awarded to Singh.193 The court in Singh agreed with 
the reasoning of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, based on the 
presumption in favor of loss as the total contract value codified in the Small 
Business Jobs Act of 2010.194 In the Small Business Jobs Act, Congress 
codified the presumption in part as, “[i]n every contract . . . which is set 
aside . . .  there shall be a presumption of loss to the United States based on 
the total amount expended on the contract” whenever a small business 
contract received an award by fraud.195 The court found the presumption to 
clearly indicate Congressional intent on how loss should be calculated and 
determined that Congress reaffirmed the presumption in the federal register 
as one that will be utilized in all criminal federal court proceedings.196 
Although the court recognized that presumptions may generally be rebutted, 
the court noted that no statute or regulation permits such a rebuttal in these 
circumstances.197 
The Singh Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United 
States v. Martin, which asserted that total loss should be mitigated based on 
services rendered because the rule of lenity that remains a rule of last resort 
in statutory interpretation, does not apply to unambiguous statutes with clear 
presumptions.198 Moreover, the court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and 
 
 191  Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 28.  
 192  Id.  
 193  Id. at 30. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (citing Pub. L. No. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010)); 
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Leahy, 464 
F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 317–18 (4th 
Cir. 2000); 15 U.S.C. § 632(w)(1) (2012); 13 C.F.R. § 121.108(a) (2016). 
 196  See Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811, 38812–16 (June 28, 
2013) (“[I]t is SBA’s intent that the presumption of loss shall be applied in all manner of 
criminal . . . actions, which the United States government may take to redress willful 
misrepresentation.”) (emphasis added).  
 197 See 13 C.F.R. § 121.108(d) (2016) (stating that the presumption may only be rebutted 
“in the case of unintentional errors, technical malfunctions, or other similar situations that 
demonstrate that a misrepresentation of size was not affirmative, intentional . . . or willful . . . 
under the False Claims Act.”).  
 198  United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2015); Singh, 195 F. Supp. 
3d at 31. 
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the Fifth Circuit’s similar conclusion in United States v. Harris because both 
Circuits failed to consider the statutory presumption contained in section 
632(w)(1).199 Finally, the court concluded that the Third Circuit’s holding in 
Nagle (agreeing with the Martin and Harris courts) does not affect its 
reasoning because the Nagle decision concerned the DOT’s DBE program, 
not the SBA’s 8(a) program.200 In conclusion, the court, consistent with the 
presumption codified in the Small Business Jobs Act, calculated loss to the 
government under the Guidelines’ to be $8,533,562.86, the total amount of 
the contracts awarded to Singh.201 
Just ten months later, in United States v. Crummy, Judge Jackson, also 
writing for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
arrived at the opposite conclusion of Singh.202 The court in Crummy held that 
in an 8(a) fraud case, loss to the government should be calculated by 
subtracting the total contract price from the fair market value of services 
rendered, irrespective of the statutory loss presumption contained in the 
Small Business Jobs Act.203 MCC Construction Company, a general 
contractor ineligible for 8(a) certification, retained Company 1 (“C1”), an 
8(a) certified subcontractor specializing in renewable energy contraction 
programs.204 MCC and C1 defrauded the government by entering into 
“teaming agreements” that allowed C1 to nominally serve as the prime 
contractor on projects.205 Although MCC and C1 complied with 8(a) 
regulations on paper, the teaming agreements allowed Crummy and MCC to 
use C1 to filter 8(a) reserved projects to MCC in violation of 8(a) 
certification parameters.206 Through this process, the government awarded 
Crummy and MCC/CI two Coast Guard contracts valued at over one million 
dollars.207 
In Crummy, the court found the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United 
States v. Harris to be persuasive. To that end, the court held that the total 
loss amount for purposes of section 2B1.1(b)(1) was zero after the mandatory 
application of the credits against loss provision contained in Application 
Note 3(E).208 Furthermore, the court held that even if the statutory 
presumption in the Small Business Act applies, it may be overcome by the 
 
 199  United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2016); Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 31–
32. 
 200  Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d. at 32–33. 
 201  Id. at 33. 
 202  United States v. Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d 475 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 203  Id. at 476.  
 204  Id. at 478. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Id. 
 207  Id. at 478–79. 
 208   Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 481. 
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credits against loss provision within the application notes.209 The court 
embraced Harris’ reasoning that the SBA 8(a) program does not constitute a 
“government benefit” because the “mere fact that a government contract 
furthers some public policy objective” is insufficient to transform the 
contract into a government benefit.210 If the 8(a) program does not constitute 
a “government benefit,” the court concluded that Application Note 3(E) 
applies because “to conclude otherwise would be to ignore the fact that the 
[Sentencing] Commission defines ‘actual loss’ for section 2B1.1(b)(1) 
purposes as the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from 
the offense.”211 Mitigating loss under 3(E) “properly focuses the loss inquiry 
on the pecuniary impact of the victims[.]”212 The court noted that the 
government’s loss will not always be zero because it may be appropriate to 
apply the procurement fraud rule in note 3(A)(v)(II) that allows for loss to 
include “reasonably foreseeable administrative costs” to remedy the fraud.213 
Finally, the court held that the Small Business Jobs Act presumption 
contained in section 632(w) did not indicate that Congress intended to 
displace the Guidelines calculation for total loss.214 The presumption does 
not mandate that sentencing judges disregard Note 3(E) that states “loss shall 
be reduced by . . . the fair market value . . . of services rendered.”215 The 
court noted that the presumption fits within the Commission’s statutory 
framework by establishing a presumptive loss total as the entire contract 
awarded, but that the loss total may be reduced by Note 3(E) in cases such 
as this where “it is difficult to conceive of the government’s true pecuniary 
loss as the entire amount of the Section 8(a) contract.”216 
The Crummy court used a nuanced analysis to distinguish this holding 
from its previous precedential holding in Singh less than a year prior. Judge 
Jackson noted that to the extent her decision conflicts with Singh, “the 
undersigned respectfully disagrees” with Singh’s analysis and conclusion.217 
Judge Jackson, after acknowledging the circuit split on the loss calculation 
issue, wrote that 8(a) program contracts should not be considered 
“government benefits” for the purposes of loss calculation. Judge Jackson 
 
 209  Id. at 482. 
 210  Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 603–04 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 211  Id. at 482 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1. cmt. n.3(a)(i) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016)) (emphasis added).  
 212  Id. at 483 (citing Harris, 821 F.3d at 606).  
 213  Id. at 484 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (2016)); see United States v. 
Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring) (applying 
procurement fraud note 3(A)(v)(II) instead of 3(E) to mitigate loss and reach the same result).   
 214  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 485.  
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. at 486. 
 217  Id. at 486–87. 
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found Singh’s analysis unpersuasive because the Singh opinion failed to 
mention Note 3(E) entirely, and Singh “was primarily concerned about the 
manner in which the presumptive loss amount may be rebutted” versus the 
issue in Crummy of whether Note 3(E) may be applied in an 8(a) fraud 
case.218 
IV. IMPLICATIONS & ANALYSIS 
Billions of dollars remain at risk due to an individual’s ability to 
defraud the government contracting process due to lax sentencing rules.219 
This risk makes the need to resolve the current circuit split and begin federal 
sentencing reform in “affirmative action” government contracts of the 
utmost importance. To address the current circuit split, the Commission 
should revise the Notes to ensure that criminals who illegally exploit 
government programs can be held accountable for the full amount of money 
awarded by the government, regardless of the benefits or services provided. 
A. The Origin of the Problem: A Significant Change to the Guidelines 
Within the Last Decade Creates the Need for Urgent Reform to 
Clarify Federal Sentencing Rules and to Return to Congress’s 
Original Goals of Maintaining Uniformity and Fairness in 
Federal Sentencing. 
In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
Guidelines Manual’s commentary which interprets or explains a guideline is 
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”220 
Moreover, the court asserted that the “[G]uidelines commentary, interpreting 
or explaining the application of a guideline, is binding on [the Court] when 
we are applying that [G]uideline because we are obligated to adhere to the 
Commission’s definition.”221 Significantly, in 2001, the Commission merged 
the government benefits special rule under section 2F1.1 into section 
2B1.1.222 The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits based their decisions 
on the now non-existent section 2F1.1 in holding that SBA and DBE 
 
 218  Id. at 487. 
 219  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-89-26,  HIGHWAY CONTRACTING: 
ASSESSING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S 
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (1988)  (finding that contractors paid over 
1 million dollars to settle fraud claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and 
investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 8–9 (stating that 
the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million 
dollars over 15 years). 
 220  Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). 
 221  Stinson, 508 U.S. at 43.  
 222  United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 605 n.12 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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programs should be considered government benefit programs.223 
Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits based their decisions on the 
1997 and 1998 Guidelines under the former section 2F1.1, which did not 
require that loss be reduced by fair market value of services rendered akin to 
current rule 3(E)(i).224 The Commission later consolidated section 2F1.1 with 
section 2B1.1 in the 2001 Guidelines.225 The Guidelines rule change was 
noteworthy because the old rule 2F1.1 contained a provision similar to 
current rule 3(F)(ii) (which both courts relied on), but no rule allowing loss 
mitigation resembling 3(E)(i).226 If the Comments cannot be amended, the 
Supreme Court should hold that “affirmative action” contract programs are 
“government benefit” programs to reconcile decisions made under the old 
rules with the new rules. 
B. Re-Evaluating United States v. Harris: The “Government 
Benefits” Special Rule and Congressional Intent Weakened 
If the Fifth Circuit had properly interpreted the Guidelines under the 
noscitur a sociss doctrine, the court should have applied the government 
benefits special rule to calculate loss instead of the general loss rule. The 
noscitur a sociss doctrine, Latin for “it is known by the company that it 
keeps,” is a concept frequently employed in interpreting statutory 
construction.227 The Fifth Circuit held that the general loss rule applied and 
that the noscitur a sociss doctrine precluded 8(a) programs from being read 
into the enumerated examples listed in 3(F)(ii).228 Nevertheless, the Fifth 
Circuit erred in applying the general loss rule for three reasons. 
First, the Fifth Circuit’s previous application of the government 
benefits rule in United States v. Dowl on similar facts undermines its decision 
in United States v. Harris. In Harris, the Fifth Circuit cited the four types of 
programs to which it had previously applied the government benefits rule for 
 
 223  Id. (“The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, confronted with similar facts, have 
declined to reduce loss by the value of services provided, but each court’s analysis was 
embedded in the language of the government benefits rule that we hold does not apply); see 
United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying 1997 
Guidelines); United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 1998 
Guidelines); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Furthermore, [these cases] were decided under the former U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 2F1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1998), which did not contain an application 
note requiring that loss be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered akin to current 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (2016)”). 
 224  Harris, 821 F.3d at 605. 
 225  See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt. n.8(d) (1998). 
 226  Id. 
 227  See Scalia & Garner, supra note 91, at 195–98 (describing the noscitur a sociis canon 
as a principle of statutory interpretation). 
 228  Harris, 821 F.3d at 602–04. 
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sentencing.229 Specifically, the court previously applied the 3(F)(ii) 
government benefits special rule in cases involving: EPA grants, SBA loans, 
FEMA disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare reimbursements.230 In 
Dowl, the Fifth Circuit held that the government benefits rule applied when 
the “[defendant] submitted fraudulent applications [with the SBA’s disaster 
assistance loan program] to obtain government funds” and later spent them 
inappropriately.231 The court applied the government benefits special rule in 
3(F)(ii) because the defendant’s scheme “deprived the Government of the 
funds’ economic value for aiding homeowners’ rebuilding efforts after 
Hurricane Katrina.”232 While the disaster assistance loan in Dowl did not 
reserve funds for a racial minority or women, the court noted –similar to 8(a) 
fraud –that the scheme diverted government money from the intended 
recipients to the defendant.233 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Harris, like 
Dowd, should have applied the government benefits special rule because in 
each case, the defendant diverted funds reserved for a government specified 
recipient to an unintended recipient causing the government a double-loss.234 
Second, in United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit erred in relying on 
the noscitur a sociss doctrine when it concluded that the SBA 8(a) Joint 
Venture program did not share common features with the 3(F)(ii) 
enumerated list because defense contracts require a “bargained for 
exchange” and a mutual transfer of benefits.235 Indeed, the court 
acknowledged that an “affirmative action” contract program may benefit the 
recipient; however, the court stated that the three examples in 3(F)(ii) involve 
“a unilateral transfer,” not a “bargained-for exchange.”236 The court, 
invoking the noscitur a sociss doctrine, ultimately held that the government 
benefits rule did not apply because “unlike the enumerated examples, 
contracts awarded under the 8(a) program do not exist primarily to benefit 
the awardee; rather, such contracts first and foremost serve the government’s 
 
 229  Id. 
 230  United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 521–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (contemplating EPA 
grants); United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 560–61 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing FEMA 
disaster relief reimbursement payments); United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 502–04 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (considering SBA loans); United States v. Jones, 475 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(analyzing Medicare reimbursements). 
 231  Dowl, 619 F.3d at 502. 
 232  Id.  
 233  Id. (emphasis added). 
 234  See United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 3(F)(ii) 
applies because stealing from the DBE program implicates a “double loss” to the government 
including “the loss that we computed and the real loss to all people that [did not] get 
[affirmative action contract] business, that [did not] get a chance to become [a] successful 
[MBE] or [WBE], because this huge amount was diverted”). 
 235  United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 603 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 236  Id. 
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own procurement needs.”237 The reality remains just the opposite. 8(a)’s 
purpose indirectly allows the government to fulfill its procurement needs. 
Yet, Congress expressly instituted 8(a) and DBE programs to benefit the 
awardee directly by providing minorities and women a fair chance in the 
marketplace where minorities historically retained no opportunities or in 
some cases where minorities and women continue to realize stifled business 
opportunity.238 
Third, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the 3(A) general rule applies 
to “affirmative action contracts” because they neither involve traditional 
consideration, nor the bargaining context of private contracts, overlooks the 
nature of how individuals receive such contracts.239 Unlike traditional 
contracts that require consideration to be valid, a business can receive 8(a) 
contracts by simply filling out a form with basic information, the job to be 
completed, and certification that the business complied with the statute’s 
SBA minority work requirements.240 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit conceded, and 
Congress explicitly provided, that 8(a) Joint Venture contracts may be “won 
through competition,” as in through a competitive bidding process, or non-
competitively on a “sole source” basis, where the government awards a 
contract because only one business meets the government’s bidding 
criteria.241 As a result, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, 8(a) and DBE 
 
 237  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(2)(B) (“[R]equiring that each federal agency’s annual 
goals for the participation of disadvantaged small businesses in the agency’s procurement 
contracts ‘shall realistically reflect the potential of . . . small business concerns owned and 
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals . . . to perform such 
contracts’”)). 
 238  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 217 (2000) (per curiam) 
(“Congress has adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned and 
controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged”); see also 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 
(stating objectives of DBE Program are, among other things, “to ensure nondiscrimination in 
the award and administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” to create a level playing field for 
DBEs, and to “assist the development of firms that can compete successfully in the 
marketplace outside the DBE program”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (stating, among 
other things, that it is the policy of Congress to aid, counsel, and assist small businesses in 
their competitive enterprises and assist such businesses to compete in international markets); 
13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2018) (stating that the “purpose of the SBA 8(a) [Business Development] 
program is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the American 
economy through business development.”); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that 
taxpayers are impacted when public funds are allocated contrary to congressional intent). 
 239  Harris, 821 F.3d at 591–92. 
 240  Id.; see generally 13 C.F.R. § 124.201– 07 (2018). 
 241  Harris, 821 F.3d at 591–92; 13 C.F.R. § 124.501 (2016); National Association of State 
Procurement Officials, Non- Competitive / Sole Source Procurement: Seven Questions, 
BRIEFING PAPER 1, 3 (Jan. 2015), http://www.naspo.org/solesourceprocurement/7-
Question_Sole_Source_Procurement_briefing_paper-1-13-15.pdf (defining sole source 
contract procurement as “any contract entered into without a competitive process, based on 
the justification that only one known source exists or that only one single supplier can fulfill 
the requirements”). 
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contracts frequently involve a unilateral transfer of public taxpayer money –
on a “sole source” basis –to an applicant without traditional contract 
negotiations or legal consideration similar to EPA grants, SBA loans, FEMA 
disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare reimbursements.242 Moreover, 
in contrast with United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. 
Lopez previously held that defrauding a federal contract program [the Javits-
Wagner-O’Day Act or “JWOD”] designed to employ blind and disabled 
individuals constituted a loss under the government benefits rule.243 In 
Lopez, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government benefits rule applied 
when Lopez directed only nine percent of the contract award to the intended 
disabled or blind recipients.244 Although Lopez did not involve racial-based 
affirmative action goals, the court held that the government benefits rule 
nevertheless applied because “[t]he focus in the JWOD program is on 
providing employment opportunities for the severely disabled, not on the 
specific product or service provided.”245 For example, the government 
benefits special rule in the 3(F)(ii) list states that the rule applies to “(e.g., 
grants, loans, entitlement program payments).”246 As stated above, and 
contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 8(a) and DBE programs could be 
reconciled with the noscitur a sociss doctrine and be identified as unilateral 
grants or “program payments” due to the unilateral nature of procurement 
procedures, the lack of consideration exchanged between parties, and the 
bargaining dynamics involved. Therefore, if a federal contract program to 
specifically benefit the disabled constitutes a “government benefit,” so too 
should 8(a). In conclusion, given the holdings in Lopez and Dowl, and 
Congress’s explicit intent in creating the SBA and DBE programs, the 
government benefits special rule enumerated example list should be 
construed broadly to include SBA 8(a) and DBE programs. 
C. Applying the Government Benefits Special Loss Rules for 
Defrauding “Affirmative Action” Government Contracts Will 
Promote Fairness, Re-Invigorate Congress’s Public Policy 
Goals, Deter Potential White Collar Criminals, and Send a 
Strong Message to the Public That Stealing from the Government 
 
 242  See United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 521–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (analyzing EPA 
grants); United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 560–61 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting FEMA disaster 
relief reimbursement payments); United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 502–04 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing SBA loans); United States v. Jones, 475 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(considering Medicare reimbursements). 
 243  United States v. Lopez, 486 F. App’x 461, 463 (5th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential).  
 244  Id.  
 245  Id. at 467. 
 246  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016); Harris, 821 F.3d at 602. 
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and Disadvantaged Businesses Will Not Be Condoned. 
In the interests of public policy and fairness, the Commission should 
amend the Notes to ensure that defrauding an “affirmative action” 
government program results in a loss equal to the entire contract award 
without mitigation. Specifically, the public policy purposes for 3(F)(ii), to 
ensure maximum punishment for stealing from the government and 
taxpayers, should not be circumvented or frustrated by Note 3(E)(i) or Note 
3(F)(v)(II), as currently written. To remedy the situation, the Commission 
should revise the sentencing rules to ensure that criminals who illegally 
exploit government programs are held accountable for the full amount of 
money awarded by the government regardless of any benefits or services 
provided. Moreover, “affirmative action” contract programs should be 
considered “government benefits” because Congress created such programs 
to enforce a government policy favoring socially disadvantaged individuals 
in the marketplace.247 Finally, Congress explicitly created the Commission 
to “combat crime honestly through an effective, fair system.”248 To realize 
Congress’s goals, fairness demands that anyone who defrauds a government 
“affirmative action” program should be sentenced under 3(F)(ii) to guarantee 
that the loss will be the entire contract total awarded just as if the criminal 
defrauded Medicare, the EPA, or welfare benefits. 
“Affirmative action” contract programs should also be considered 
“government benefits,” in order to strengthen and reassert deterrence 
interests in federal sentencing. The theory of deterrence in criminal law relies 
on the assumption that fear of punishment will influence potential criminals 
not to break the law.249 To increase deterrence, the Commission should 
amend the Guidelines’ text for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) in 
order to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) 
applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current 
language stating that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision 
 
 247  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 217 (2000) (“Congress has 
adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned and controlled by the 
socially and economically disadvantaged.”); see 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 (stating objectives of 
DBE Program are, among other things, “[t]o ensure nondiscrimination in the award and 
administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” “[t]o create a level playing field” for DBEs, and 
to “assist the development of firms that can compete successfully in the marketplace outside 
the DBE program”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2018) (stating among other things that it is the 
policy of Congress to aid, counsel, and assist small businesses in their competitive enterprises 
and assist such businesses to compete in international markets); 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2018) 
(stating the “purpose of the [SBA] 8(a) [Business Development] program is to assist eligible 
small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the American economy through business 
development”); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that taxpayers are impacted 
when public funds are allocated contrary to congressional intent). 
 248  U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016). 
 249  Deterrence Theory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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(A).”250 Amending the Notes in this manner will standardize punishments 
and deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs 
regardless of whether a business fully performs a contract. The Notes should 
be reformed because a federal court’s ability to mitigate loss under 
3(F)(v)(II) or 3(E)(i) undermines the deterrence role and the recognition of 
non-pecuniary loss envisioned by the drafters of 3(F)(ii). Congress created 
the Commission to “introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by 
narrowing discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed 
by similar offenders.”251 Uniformity—where courts treat all individuals 
similarly and with fair notice—increases deterrence, since all individuals 
know that they will receive a harsher penalty for a given offense.252 
Consequently, the existing circuit split on the issue of “affirmative action” 
government programs undermines the benefits of deterrence provided by 
uniform sentencing and the goals set forth by Congress in creating the 
Commission and the Guidelines.253 In the context of economic crimes, the 
symbolism of higher prison terms “is important [in deterring white collar 
crime or contract procurement fraud] because the strongest possible message 
should be sent to those who would engage in similar conduct that they will 
be caught and punished to the full extent of the law.”254 
The Notes should also be amended to address specific deterrence and 
general deterrence to maximize the deterrent effect on individuals that may 
consider stealing from the SBA and DBE programs.255 Critically, amending 
the Notes will deter federal courts from “succumbing to the impulse to see 
[white collar] defendants in the warm light of a contrite individual who 
engaged in aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend again.”256 In the 
alternative, even if higher sentences do not reduce fraud crime directly, 
greater prison time may “deter judges from going to one extreme or the 
other” . . . because higher sentencing “requires consideration of the impact 
on society and not solely the particular offender.”257 Furthermore, higher 
standardized punishments will promote deterrence in sentencing of 
individuals who steal from “affirmative action” contracts because fraud in 
 
 250  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2016). 
 251  U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016). 
 252  See Henning, supra note 3, at 27–28.  
 253  See id. at 56–58; U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016). 
 254  Henning, supra note 3, at 28. 
 255  See id. at 31 (stating that specific deterrence concerns deterring a specific defendant, 
while general deterrence seeks to deter those criminals similarly situated from engaging in 
future crimes because the cost of potentially committing the crime exceeds the benefit of 
attempting or succeeding in committing the crime). 
 256  Id. at 32 (citing Stanton Wheeler, Kenneth Mann & Austin Sarat, SITTING IN 
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (Yale Univ. Press 1988). 
 257  Id. at 58. 
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such cases involves substantial non-pecuniary loss to amorphous victims.258 
Therefore, to achieve maximum deterrence, the Commission should amend 
the Guidelines to vindicate non-pecuniary loss to the government, taxpayers 
and “amorphous victims” including the small business contract procurement 
market.259 In government fraud cases, many defendants plead that there is no 
loss to the government or society because the defendants performed all 
contractual obligations.260 To eliminate such defenses, defendants should be 
liable for the full price of a contract award because “[i]t is conceivable that 
the government paid a premium contract price above what it would pay for 
other contracts under normal competitive bidding procedures.”261 Therefore, 
the amended Guidelines should recognize that loss to the government 
includes a double loss: the loss to taxpayers and the excess funds the 
government paid to a DBE or 8(a) business to realize Congress’s policy goals 
of aiding minority and women owned businesses.262 
Public policy further demands that defendants be responsible for the 
entire contract award because “[defendant’s] fraud harmed the integrity of 
the [8(a) and DBE] programs, which were designed to help legitimately 
disadvantaged businesses. There may also be harm . . . to legitimate program 
participants whose businesses might have received the contracts that were 
awarded to [defendant].”263 The government should be reimbursed fully for 
the traditional loss as well as the latent loss to allow the recouped funds to 
flow back into government coffers with the goal of aiding legitimate, law 
abiding minority applicants. Principally, reform will aid the market writ 
large and other “amorphous victims” affected by white collar contract 
fraud.264 As the Guidelines recognize that “there may be cases in which the 
offense level determined under [section 2B1.1] substantially understates the 
seriousness of the offense,” the Notes should be reformed to account for the 
invisible, non-pecuniary loss involved in fraud of SBA and DBE 
programs.265 Further examples of non-pecuniary loss caused by DBE 
program fraud include discouraging potential legitimate disadvantaged 
 
 258  Id. at 33–34. 
 259  See McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing consequences of DBE fraud where DBE 
fraud is unique because it prevents real DBEs from “grow[ing]and build[ing] their businesses” 
and from “gain[ing] crucial experience”). 
 260  See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015). (noting that, 
on appeal, defendant Martin claimed that there was no net “loss” and no “non-pecuniary loss” 
because MarCon performed the contract completely and adequately). 
 261  Id. 
 262  United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 263  Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111. 
 264  Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining that “the market” or a faceless organization 
may be affected by “affirmative action” contract fraud without society, traditional 
stakeholders or citizens noticing the impact). 
 265  Id. 
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businesses from entering the DBE program and preventing actual recognized 
DBEs from graduating from the program.266 In sum, the Commission should 
amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to 
clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies 
“notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating 
that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A)” to standardize and 
deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs 
regardless as to whether a business fully performs a contract. 267 
D. The Way Forward: Preventing the Nagle Outcome Through 
Reasonable Reform 
United States v. Nagle embodies the model case study to examine how 
the Guidelines remain fundamentally flawed without reform. Based on the 
current text, the Third Circuit reasonably interpreted the Notes in applying 
3(A)(v)(II) and 3(E)(i) instead of 3(F)(ii) to “affirmative action” contract 
fraud.268 Regrettably, the Third Circuit’s decision “weakened prosecutor’s 
chances of successfully seeking [longer] prison sentences when the court 
allowed offsetting for contractual performance . . . in calculating . . . 
‘loss.’”269 An examination of United States v. Nagle reveals three current 
textual issues that undermine the purpose of 3(F)(ii). First, 3(F) currently 
states “Special Rules “Notwithstanding subdivision (A).”270 This provision 
undercuts special rule 3(F)(ii) by providing that the government benefits 
special rule only supersedes the subsection (A) general loss rule. Second, 
several circuit courts mitigated loss using 3(F)(v) (covering 
misrepresentation schemes) or using 3(A)(v)(II) (involving fraud of defense 
contracts).271 Because many SBA 8(a) and DBE fraud cases involve Defense 
Department contracts, the general rule in 3(A) robs 3(F)(ii) of its purpose. 
Given that “affirmative action” contracts remain dissimilar to traditional 
contracts, there is no rational reason why defense contracts under 8(a) or the 
DBE should be treated differently than all other 8(a)/DBE construction and 
transportation contracts. 
Third, several circuits reasonably concluded that mitigating rule 3(E)(i) 
“Credits Against Loss” note applies to reduce a criminal’s total “loss.”272 
 
 266  McVicker, supra note 3, at 7; Leahy, 464 F.3d at 789. 
 267  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 268  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 168, 183 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 269  Reese, supra note 4, at 681.  
 270  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (2016); see Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181–83. 
 271  Nagle, 803 F.3d at 183 (Hardiman, J., concurring); United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 
589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 272  Harris, 821 F.3d 589; Martin, 796 F.3d at 1104 ; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) 
(2016). 
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Despite the Third Circuit assuming that DBE contracts constituted 
government benefits regardless as to whether 3(A) or 3(F) applies, the court 
held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with credit for fair 
market value of services provided under section 3(E)(i).273 As a result, 
section 3(E)(i) and the current “[n]otwithstanding Subsection A” language 
frustrates the goals of 3(F)(ii) even if, as in Nagle, the court assumes that the 
DBE program constitutes a “government benefit.”274 Thus, to resolve the 
textual issues in the Notes, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for 
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government 
benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions 
(A–E)” instead of the current language stating that special rules apply 
“notwithstanding subdivision (A).”275 Amending the Notes in this manner 
will clearly indicate that the 3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” provision does 
not supersede the 3F special rules. Adding this clarifying language will 
harmonize the Notes with the statutory presumption codified in the Small 
Business Act in 2010. Although none of the circuit courts to address the issue 
discussed the presumption and its potential interaction with the Notes, the 
fact that two federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit Court recently came 
to two opposite conclusions on whether the presumption applies emphasizes 
the need for immediate clarification. After the sentencing rules are clarified, 
any federal court that concludes that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs constitute 
government benefits programs will be bound to apply the 3(F)(ii) special loss 
rules in lieu of the general loss rule in sub-section (A). Requiring the 
application of 3(F)(ii) will ensure that a criminal who steals from any 
“affirmative action” program will be responsible for the full contract price 
awarded without mitigation for any legitimate services rendered.276 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Commission should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss 
under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule 
under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the 
current language stating that special rules apply “notwithstanding 
subdivision (A).”277 With differing circuit interpretations on how to apply 
the Notes and the uncertainty surrounding the Small Business Jobs Act 
statutory presumption, it is imperative that the Commission amend the Notes 
to ensure that the government benefits rule applies to all SBA and DBE 
affirmative action programs. The lack of clarity regarding which rules apply 
 
 273  United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 168, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 274  Id. at 181. 
 275  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(B)(1) (2016). 
 276  See id. 
 277  See id. 
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to “affirmative action” contracts continues to exacerbate the discrepancies in 
sentencing, while eroding the benefits of such programs to the individuals 
who rightfully deserve financial help in their businesses. Until the 
Commission amends the Notes, the Supreme Court should hold that SBA 
8(a) and DBE programs comprise government benefits to provide guidance 
and certainty in federal sentencing for white collar crimes. 
This note scrutinizes the background of the Commission, the relevant 
rules at issue and the various circuit court cases that resolved the issue. 
Likewise, this note offers a feasible solution to revive the principle that 
defrauding government benefits consistently comes with a steep price. 
Although opponents may suggest that Congress intended to create flexible 
guidelines for federal courts, a district court imbued with too much 
sentencing discretion will ultimately lead to injustice, diluted deterrence, and 
disparate outcomes across the nation. In conclusion, this note proposes 
reasonable solutions to re-calibrate federal sentencing with Congress’s 
original goals and give fair notice to offenders that they will be liable for 
everything they steal from the people. 
 
